

# UPDATES TO WHISTLEBLOWING AND RETALIATION: SARBANES- OXLEY, DODD-FRANK, AND TITLE VII – MARCH 2015

Mark J. Oberti  
Oberti Sullivan LLP  
Houston, Texas  
(713) 401-3555 (phone)  
[Mark@osattorneys.com](mailto:Mark@osattorneys.com) (e-mail)  
[www.osattorneys.com](http://www.osattorneys.com)

# INTRODUCTION

- Covers topics related to retaliation and whistleblowing laws
- Focus on unique, new, and timely topics
- Use legal insights to give practical advice on how best to manage and litigate retaliation and whistleblowing issues and claims
- Emphasis on update regarding Dodd-Frank and SOX whistleblower provisions, hot 2013-2015 Dodd-Frank and SOX whistleblower cases, and the what the landscape will look like in the future for these sorts of claims

# NASSAR AND THE CAT'S PAW DOCTRINE

- Do the *Nassar* and *Gross* But-For Causation Standard Render the *Staub v. Proctor Hospital* Cat's-Paw Theory Unavailable in Title VII or ADEA Retaliation cases?
  - *Goodsite v. Norfolk Southern Ry. Co.*, 2014 WL 4192786, \*12, n.7 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir., August 25, 2014) (“it would appear that, at a minimum, the cat’s paw theory of liability must be modified in Title VII retaliation cases.”).
  - *Bishop v. Ohio Dep’t of Rehab. & Corrs.*, 529 Fed. App’x 685, 699-700 (7<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2013) (McKeague, J., dissenting) (stating that *Nassar*’s holding requires Title VII plaintiffs to show that the supervisor’s wrongful actions were the but-for cause of their termination).
  - *Sims v. MVM, Inc.*, 704 F.3d 1327, 1335-36 (11<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2013) (“Because the ADEA requires a ‘but-for’ link between the discriminatory animus and adverse action as opposed to showing that the animus was a ‘motivating factor’ . . . We hold that *Staub*’s ‘proximate causation’ standard does not apply to cat’s paw cases involving age discrimination.”)

# NASSAR AND THE CAT'S PAW DOCTRINE

- The Fifth Circuit Has Raised the Question But Not Decided it.
  - *Holliday v. Commonwealth Brands, Inc.*, 483 Fed. App'x 917, 922 n.2 (5<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2012) (noting “it is entirely unclear whether our [prior ADEA cat’s paw] decisions remain good law in the wake of *Gross* . . . and *Staub* . . .”; “it could very well be that our prior recognition of ‘cat’s paw’ liability under the ADEA was incorrect).
- The Courts Are Not Fully in Agreement
  - *Daniels v. Pioneer Cent. School Dist.*, 2012 WL 1391922 (W.D.N.Y., April 20, 2012) (stating and citing numerous cases for proposition that there is no reason why the analysis in *Staub* cannot be reconciled with *Gross*’s but-for causation standard).
  - *Murphy v. Center for Emergency Medicine of Western Pennsylvania, Inc.*, 944 F. Supp.2d 406, 431 n.75 (W.D. Pa. 2013) (applying cat’s-paw doctrine in ADEA case, and rejecting *Sims* and *Holliday*).

# NASSAR AND THE CAT'S PAW DOCTRINE

- The Sixth Circuit Has Articulated a Modified Test.
  - *Seoane-Vazquez v. Ohio State University*, 577 Fed. Appx. 418, 428 (6<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2014) (“we hold that cat’s paw liability will lie in this [Title VII retaliation] case if: (1) nondecisionmakers took actions to deny Plaintiff tenure in retaliation for his protected conduct, and (2) those retaliatory actions were a but-for cause of Alutto’s decision to deny tenure.”).

# HR, COMPLIANCE PERSONNEL, AND MANAGERS?

- Most Courts Hold That Human Resources Personnel And Other Managers Must “Step Outside” Their Normal Job Duties To Engage In Protected Oppositional Activity Under Title VII And Other Anti-Discrimination and Anti-Retaliation Laws
  - *Hagan v. Echostar Satellite, L.L.C.*, 529 F.3d 617, 628 (5th Cir. 2008)
  - *Brush v. Sears Holdings Corp.*, No. 11-10657, 2012 WL 987543 (11th Cir. Mar. 26, 2012)
  - So, “I was just doing my job and they fired me for it!” usually gets the HR plaintiff – and other managers – thrown out of court on a retaliation claim based on the opposition-clause.

# HR, COMPLIANCE PERSONNEL, AND MANAGERS

- Does this rule apply to SOX retaliation claims?
- *Riddle v. First Tennessee Bank*, No. 3:10-cv-0578, 2011 WL 4348298, at \*8 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 16, 2011), *aff'd*, NO. 11-6277, 2012 WL 3799231 (6th Cir. Aug. 31, 2012) said “yes,” but without analysis or meaningful discussion.
- In contrast, the Administrative Review Board takes the opposite view. See *Robinson v. Morgan–Stanley*, Case No. 07–070, 2010 WL 348303, at \*8 (ARB Jan. 10, 2010) (“[Section 1514A] does not indicate that an employee’s report or complaint about a protected violation must involve actions outside the complainant’s assigned duties.”);
- And, at least one federal district court has followed the ARB on this point. See *Barker v. UBS AG*, 888 F. Supp. 2d 291, 297 (D. Conn. 2012) (rejecting employer’s argument that the employee’s SOX claim had to be dismissed because she never stepped outside her role).

## SEEMINGLY “NO BRAINER” TERMINATION DECISIONS CAN BECOME CLOSE CALLS WHEN THE EMPLOYEE HAS BEEN PARTICIPATING IN PROTECTED ACTIVITIES

- Expressing A Desire To Kill A Supervisor: *Coleman v. Donahoe*, 667 F.3d 835 (7th Cir. 2012)
- Expressing A Desire To Knock Out A HR Manager’s Teeth: *Miller v. Illinois Dept. of Transp.*, 643 F.3d 190 (7th Cir. 2011)
- Failing To Satisfy A Performance Improvement Plan’s Objective Sales Production Goals That Were Put In Place Before The Employee Engaged In Protected Activity: *Smith v. Xerox Corp.*, 371 Fed. Appx. 514 (5th Cir. Mar. 2010)

## POSITIVE TREATMENT OF AN EMPLOYEE AFTER THEIR PROTECTED ACTIVITY IS OFTEN – BUT NOT ALWAYS – REGARDED AS POTENT PROOF OF NON-RETALIATION

- In *Brady v. Houston Independent School Dist.*, 113 F.3d 1419, 1424 (5th Cir. 1997) and *Moticka v. Weck Closure Systems*, 183 Fed. Appx. 343, 353 (4th Cir. 2006), the courts relied on such evidence to reject retaliation claims.
- But, in *Feder v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co.*, 33 F. Supp. 2d 319, 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), the court was unimpressed and skeptical of such evidence.
- Still, if an employer can do something nice for an employee after they have engaged in protected activity, it normally helps.

## A SUFFICIENTLY SPECIFIC INTERNAL COMPLAINT, WHETHER ORAL OR WRITTEN, IS PROTECTED FROM RETALIATION UNDER THE FLSA – EXCEPT PERHAPS IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT

- In *Kasten v. Saint-Gobain Performance Plastics Corp.*, 131 S. Ct. 1325 (2011), the U.S. Supreme Court held that an employee's oral complaint could fall within the purview of the FLSA's anti-retaliation provision.
- The Court did not say if the oral complaint had to be to the DOL, rather than to the employer, to be protected.
- But, every circuit to rule on the question, except the Second Circuit, has held that an internal complaint to the employer can qualify as protected activity under the FLSA. See, e.g., *Minor v. Bostwick Laboratories, Inc.*, 669 F.3d 428 (4th Cir. 2012).
- The complaint must be sufficiently specific to alert a reasonable employer that a FLSA violation is being alleged.

## SEVERANCE AGREEMENTS GENERALLY CANNOT INDEPENDENTLY GIVE RISE TO VALID RETALIATION CLAIMS, BUT THEY SHOULD STILL BE HANDLED WITH CARE

- *EEOC v. Lockheed Martin*, 444 F. Supp. 2d 414 (D. Md. 2006) caused great concern.
- But, subsequent cases limited *Lockheed Martin*.
- In 2013 and 2014, however, the EEOC initiated new lawsuits challenging separation agreements with fairly standard provisions in them (see paper). *E.g.*, *EEOC v. CVS* case, which was thrown out in October 2014.
- Make sure your severance agreement clearly permits the employee to go to the EEOC, or other agency. They just cannot obtain any money themselves from such action, as they are releasing any claim for monetary relief.
  - Note: In February 2015, The SEC Office of the Whistleblower expressed similar concerns regarding SOX and the use of overbroad confidentiality provisions in separation agreements and other agreements.

**IF AN EMPLOYEE ENGAGES IN MORE PROTECTED ACTIVITY AFTER AN EMPLOYER TAKES SOME ACTION AGAINST THEM, DOES THAT MEAN THAT THE EMPLOYER'S ACTION WAS NOT MATERIALLY ADVERSE, AND THUS NOT ACTIONABLE AS RETALIATION?**

- In *Bush v. Regis Corp.*, 257 Fed. Appx. 219, 222 (11th Cir. 2007) and *DeHart v. Baker Hughes Oilfield Operations, Inc.*, 214 Fed. Appx. 437, 441-42 (5th Cir. 2007), the Courts of Appeals determined that the plaintiffs had not shown that the challenged allegedly retaliatory actions (written warnings) might dissuade a reasonable employee from filing a charge in part because the plaintiffs had not in fact been deterred from subsequently filing charges of discrimination.
- **But not all courts agree:** See *Turrentine v. United Parcel Service, Inc.*, 645 F. Supp. 2d 976 (D. Kan. 2009) (stating such a rule “defies logic”); see also *Chowdhury v. Bair*, 604 F. Supp. 2d 90, 97 (D.D.C. 2009) (stating that the standard is whether a reasonable person would be dissuaded from engaging in protected activity, whether or not the plaintiff was).

## STANDARDS FOR PROTECTION FROM RETALIATION OFTEN DIFFER DRAMATICALLY DEPENDING ON WHETHER THE “OPPOSITION” OR “PARTICIPATION” CLAUSE APPLIES

- **Oppositional Activity Must Be Based On A Good-Faith, Reasonable Belief, And The Activity Itself Must Be Reasonable, Or Else It Loses Its Protection**
  1. **There Is A Good-Faith Reasonable Belief Requirement For Oppositional Activity To Be Protected**
  2. **Oppositional Activity Must Be Reasonable In The Manner It Is Exercised, Or Else It Loses Its Protection**

**Example – employee takes confidential information to support case, gets caught, and is fired.**

## CONTINUED: STANDARDS FOR PROTECTION FROM RETALIATION DEPENDING ON APPLICABLE CLAUSE

- Participation In Protected Activity Generally Need Not Be Based On A Good-Faith, Reasonable Belief To Be Protected, And Need Not Be Reasonable In The Manner Exercised, Although The Law Is Not Uniform On These Points
  1. Courts, Including the Fifth Circuit, Generally Hold That The Participation Clause Does Not Include A Good-Faith Reasonable Belief Requirement, Although The Seventh Circuit Disagrees
  2. Courts Generally Hold That The Manner In Which Participatory Activity Is Exercised Need Not Be Reasonable To Be Protected, Although Again The Seventh Circuit Disagrees
- Courts Are Split On Whether Participation In An EEOC Investigation By Giving Statements *Against* The Complainant Is Protected From Retaliation

# WHEN IS AN EMPLOYEE'S PARTICIPATION IN AN INTERNAL INVESTIGATION "PROTECTED ACTIVITY" UNDER TITLE VII?

- A. Participation In A Purely Internal Investigation Is Not Covered By Title VII's Participation Clause
- B. Participation In An Internal Investigation Triggered By An EEOC Charge Is Covered By Title VII's Participation Clause
- C. Participation In An Internal Investigation – Even If Not Triggered By An EEOC Charge – May, In Some Cases, Still Be Covered By Title VII's Opposition Clause Under The U.S. Supreme Court's Pro-employee Holding In *Crawford v. Metro. Gov't of Nashville and Davidson Cty.*, 555 U.S. 271 (2009)

# RETALIATORY HARASSMENT IS ACTIONABLE

- See *Gowski v. Peake*, 682 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2012):
  - Noting that every circuit agrees retaliatory harassment is an actionable claim, including the Fifth Circuit
  - Adopting such a claim as a matter of first impression for that court
  - Affirming a seven-figure verdict based on such a claim

# RETALIATION AND THE EXHAUSTION REQUIREMENT: A CONFLICT IS BREWING

- *Gupta* and cases like it carve out an exception to exhaustion for retaliation that occurs after the filing of an EEOC charge.
- There is an argument that the *Gupta* exception to exhaustion no longer applies after the Supreme Court's decision in *Morgan* in 2002.
- The current landscape in the *Gupta v. Morgan* battle: A couple of courts – including the 10<sup>th</sup> Circuit and 8<sup>th</sup> Circuit – have found that the *Gupta* exception no longer applies. Most courts hold that it does. But, many courts have not addressed the issue yet, so stay tuned.
- At some point, this will go to the Supreme Court.

# UPDATE ON THIRD-PARTY RETALIATION: *THOMPSON* AND BEYOND

- *Thompson* – 2011 U.S. Supreme Court case green-lights these claims in certain situations.

- **Post-*Thompson* Cases**

1. Dating Relationship
2. Best Friend
3. Spouses Employed At Two Different Employers
4. *Thompson* Extends To The ADEA
5. District Courts Split On Whether The FMLA Permits Third-Party Retaliation Claims

# 2010 DODD-FRANK ACT

## ■ Some Background:

- SEC created “Office of the Whistleblower” to administer the “Bounty Program”
- Sean McKessy, ex-Altria Group lawyer, is the Chief of the Office of the Whistleblower, and he has a staff of lawyers and investigators
- McKessy’s Office is receiving an average of seven complaints per day since it opened in August 2011 – he says they are generally high quality
- First bounty was awarded in August 2012 in amount of \$50,000.00. \$14 million dollar bounty awarded to one whistleblower in 2013! Then \$30 million in September 2014!
- McKessy’s Office will issue a comprehensive annual report every November

# 2010 DODD-FRANK ACT

## ■ Who Can Qualify As a Whistleblower?

1. The Basic Definition Of A Whistleblower Under Dodd-Frank
  
2. Although Dodd-Frank Explicitly Defines A “Whistleblower” In A Way That Only Includes Those Who Provide Information To The SEC, An Exception Has Been Carved Out That Is Rooted In A “Catch-All” Part Of The Law
  - a. Dodd-Frank’s “Catch-All” Provision Providing Whistleblower Status To Employees Who Make Certain Internal Disclosures (*see, e.g., Egan I and Kramer cases*)
  
  - b. Will Dodd-Frank’s “Catch-All” Provision Swallow SOX? (*Asadi v. Many Other Cases Split*)

# CONTINUED: DODD-FRANK: WHO CAN QUALIFY AS A WHISTLEBLOWER?

3. Individuals Who Have A Legal Or Contractual Duty To Report Violations Are Excluded From The Definition Of A Whistleblower Under Dodd-Frank
4. Individuals In Compliance-Related Roles Are Excluded From The Definition Of A Whistleblower Under Dodd-Frank
5. Exceptions To The Exclusions From The Definition Of A Whistleblower Under Dodd-Frank
6. Criminal Violators Can Be Whistleblowers Under Dodd-Frank
7. But important note: an Employee Who Is Not A Whistleblower For Purposes of Dodd-Frank's Bounty Hunter Provision, May Still be A Whistleblower For Purposes Of Its Anti-Retaliation Provisions (*Ott v. Fred Alger Mgt.*).

# WHISTLEBLOWER ANTI-RETALIATION PROVISIONS UNDER DODD-FRANK

## More Avenues For Enforcement, An Expanded Statute Of Limitations, And Liquidated Damages

- a. Direct Access To Federal Court
- b. A Long Statute Of Limitations
- c. Liquidated Damages For Retaliation In  
Violation Of Dodd-Frank

# IMPLICATIONS OF THE FINAL RULES ON INTERNAL REPORTING PROCEDURES

1. Internal Reporting Is Not Required
2. Although Not Required, The Final Rules Encourage And Reward Internal Reporting
3. Internal Reporting Alone May Constitute Protected Conduct, If The Report Was Communicated To The SEC By Others, Or The Internal Report Falls Within The “Catch-all” Provision Recognized by many courts (but not the 5<sup>th</sup> Circuit (*Asadi*)).

# SOME IMPORTANT POINTS REGARDING DODD-FRANK

- Whistleblowers do not enjoy absolute protection based on a complaint to the Office of the Whistleblower; rather, the “reasonable belief” standard applies
- Case law will continue to focus on whether Dodd-Frank’s “catch all” provision, Section 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii), essentially makes every SOX retaliation claim actionable under Dodd-Frank too. For example, in *Kramer v. Trans-Lux Corp.*, No. 3:11cv1424(SRU), 2012 WL 4444820 (D. Conn., Sept. 25, 2012), the court found that claimants who could pursue claims for retaliation under SOX may now do so instead under Dodd-Frank, thereby avoiding OSHA, being subject to a much longer statute of limitations, and recovering potentially better damages. As fully explained in the paper, other district courts have found the same, but the Fifth Circuit rejected such an approach in *Asadi* in 2013.
- Right now, because of the current, generally pro-employee ARB panel, it still makes sense for many SOX claimants to go through OSHA and the administrative process.
- That will likely change based on which party is in the White House (and thus controls the ARB composition). This is why President Obama’s election in 2008 and reelection in 2012 was so significant to SOX litigation.

# SOME IMPORTANT POINTS REGARDING DODD-FRANK

- Section 78u-6(h)(1)(A)(iii) also prohibits retaliation against individuals for providing information to a law enforcement officer about the possible commission of a federal offense, which means Dodd-Frank covers situations totally disconnected from corporate fraud
- Dodd-Frank Section 1057 creates a robust private right of action for employees in the financial services industry who suffer retaliation for disclosing information about fraudulent or unlawful conduct related to the offering or provision of a consumer financial product or service. This particular provision requires filing with OSHA within 180 days.
- If the DOL has not issued a final order within 210 days of the filing of the complaint, the complainant has the option to remove the claim to federal court and either party can request a trial by jury.
- Section 1057 claims are exempt from mandatory arbitration agreements.

# SARBANES-OXLEY UPDATE

## ■ *Parexel* And Its Prodigy Since May 2011

1. The Pre-*Parexel* Landscape – SOX claimants almost never won
2. *Parexel* dramatically alters the landscape in May 2011
3. Post-*Parexel* ARB Decisions – An Avalanche Of Favorable Decisions For SOX Complainants since *Parexel* was decided, including some really tricky and interesting ones like *Funke*, and another involving an in-house counsel in Houston (*Zinn I*)
4. Post-*Parexel* Federal Appellate Court Decisions That Follow *Parexel*
  - a. *Wiest* (3<sup>rd</sup> Cir. 2013) – gives *Parexel* Chevron deference.
  - b. *Lockheed Martin* (10<sup>th</sup> Cir. 2013) – gives *Parexel* Chevron deference.
  - c. *Nielsen* (2<sup>nd</sup> Cir. 2014) – gives *Parexel* Skidmore deference.

# OTHER RECENT SIGNIFICANT SOX DECISIONS

1. The ARB Rules That Employer Breaches Of SOX-Mandated Confidentiality May Themselves Give Rise To Liability, Even If The Employee Did Not Suffer A Traditional Adverse Employment Action

\*This case out of Houston against Halliburton includes a cautionary tale about litigation hold notices concerning current employees, and was affirmed by the Fifth Circuit in November 2014.

2. The ARB Holds That The Determination Of Whether The Claimant Satisfied The “Contributing Factor” Standard Is To Be Made Without Considering The Employer’s Controverting Evidence (*Fordham v. Fannie Mae* – Oct. 2014).
3. The U.S. Supreme Court extends SOX to employees of private companies that contract with public companies (and beyond) in *Lawson*, a 2014 decision
4. The ARB Holds That SOX Section 806 Has No Extraterritorial Application

# DAMAGES UNDER SOX

1. Courts Have Recently Changed Course Regarding Whether SOX Provides For Mental Anguish Damages. The 10<sup>th</sup> Circuit (*Lockheed*), 5<sup>th</sup> Circuit (*Halliburton*), and 4<sup>th</sup> Circuit (*Southpeak*) have all recently concluded that it does – all contrary to many earlier district court decisions.
2. The ARB Consistently Holds That SOX Permits The Award Of Mental Anguish Damages

# CONCLUSION

- There are many hot areas still developing, both under anti-retaliation laws that have been with us for more than a half-century (Title VII), and those that are relatively new (SOX and Dodd-Frank).
- There are lots of moving parts, especially in the SOX / Dodd-Frank areas.
- We hope this presentation and accompanying paper help you in your daily practice.
- Feel free to contact me directly with any questions via e-mail or phone.

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